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Recent theoretical and empirical advances have renewed interest in
monopsonistic models of the labor market. However, there is little
direct empirical support for these models. We use an exogenous
change in wages at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals as
a natural experiment to investigate the extent of monopsony in the
nurse labor market. We estimate that labor supply to individual hospitals is quite inelastic, with short-run elasticity around 0.1. We also
find that non-VA hospitals responded to the VA wage change by
changing their own wages.
I. Introduction
Standard competitive models assume that individual firms are price
takers in the labor market. However, since Robinson (1933) first coined
This project was supported by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Veterans Health Administration, Health Services Research and Development Service,
Investigator Initiated Research (IIR) Program (project 91-148). We thank Paul
Cameron, Yvonne Moody, Rona Flanger, and Susan Wheeler for their help in
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䉷 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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the term “monopsony,” economists have considered the alternative case
in which individual firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves and
therefore have market power that enables them to set wages. Originally,
monopsony power was thought to exist primarily in fairly specialized
labor markets in which a single firm bought labor in an isolated labor
market (analogous to a monopolist in a product market). More recently,
a variety of theoretical models have suggested that monopsonistic competition may be pervasive, with individual firms facing upward-sloping
labor supply curves because of the presence of oligopoly, differentiation
between firms, variation in worker preferences, moving costs, a costly job
search, or efficiency wages (Boal and Ransom 1997; Bhaskar, Manning,
and To 2002). Manning (2003) has argued that monopsony can help explain a wide range of labor market features, including the effects of the
minimum wage, firm-size wage effects, and gender and racial wage gaps.
Empirical evidence of monopsonistic competition is quite mixed (see
Boal and Ransom [1997], Bhaskar et al. [2002], and Manning [2003] for
reviews). On the one hand, monopsonistic competition provides a possible
explanation for a variety of facts that are difficult to explain in the competitive model. For example, monopsonistic competition has been used
to explain why an increase in the minimum wage led to an increase in
employment (Card and Krueger 1995; Bhaskar and To 1999), why there
is a positive relationship between firm size and wages (Green, Machin,
and Manning 1996), and why there are persistent differences across firms
in wages and vacancy rates (Yett 1975; Card and Krueger 1995; Boal and
Ransom 1997; Bhaskar and To 1999). On the other hand, direct estimation
of the elasticity of labor supply to individual firms has yielded mixed
results, suggesting that firms have very little market power over the wages
of nurses (Sullivan 1989; Hansen 1992; Matsudaira 2009) and coal miners
(Boal 1995) but some market power over the wages of teachers (Falch
2010, in this issue; Ransom and Sims 2010, in this issue).
This article investigates whether individual hospitals have monopsony
power in the labor market for registered nurses (RNs). Some have argued
that the RN labor market is a likely example of monopsony because of
persistent variations in wages across regions and across hospitals, along
with nearly continuous reports of shortages since World War II (Yett
1975; Aiken 1982; Roberts et al. 1989; Friss 1994; Greene and NordhausBike 1998). On the other hand, RNs have greater interemployer mobility
than other occupations, which suggests that RNs are mobile and that
compiling and understanding data from the VA. We also thank seminar participants at various universities and conferences and the editor and two thoughtful
referees for helpful comments. A previous version of this article was published
in the NBER Working Papers series. Contact the corresponding author, Douglas
O. Staiger, at Douglas.O.Staiger@Dartmouth.edu.
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firm-level monopsony power may be weak (Hirsch and Schumacher
2005).
We analyze the effect of an exogenous, legislated change in RN wages
at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. Our analysis differs in
two important ways from the prior literature estimating monopsony
power at the firm level. First, previous studies have used measures of
output demand as instruments for wages in estimating the supply elasticity. In contrast, our source of identification comes from a legislated
change in wages at certain hospitals. Arguably, this legislated change in
wages provides the perfect “natural experiment” with which to answer
the key question: does an exogenous change in wages at one hospital
affect employment at that hospital or at competing hospitals? A second
difference from the prior literature is that our empirical analysis is explicitly motivated by a model of geographic differentiation among firms,
similar to Salop (1979), in which hospitals compete directly only with
their nearest neighbors. In this model, geographic differentiation can be
generalized as the subjective disutility the worker suffers with each employer (Bhaskar and To 1999), with transportation costs being one of the
sources of disutility.1 This model suggests that other hospitals will change
their wages in response to the VA wage change and that the response will
be largest at hospitals that are nearest to the VA hospital.
Our empirical results are consistent with the presence of monopsony
power in the RN labor market, in large part generated by geographic
differentiation between hospitals. We find that wages at non-VA hospitals
responded to the VA wage change and that this response was largest
among hospitals located within 15 miles of a VA hospital. In addition,
we find that RN employment at individual hospitals responded very little
in the short run to the resulting changes in relative wages between hospitals. Our estimates of the short-run elasticity of labor supply to an
individual hospital average around 0.1, far lower than previous estimates
in the literature. Overall, this evidence suggests that hospitals are wage
setters in the RN labor market, with considerable market power.
II. Previous Studies of Monopsony in Nursing
Studies of monopsonistic competition in the nursing labor market have
been motivated by two observations. First, in rural regions, there may be
only one hospital and few other employers for RNs, potentially providing
RN employers with market power. Second, as stated above, there have
been persistent reports of nursing shortages since the 1940s. Research on
1
Bhaskar and To (1999) suggest that disutility to the worker can arise from
differences between worker preferences and employer characteristics. Transportation costs can underlie these differences.
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nursing labor markets has provided conflicting evidence about the monopsony hypothesis.
Studies of nursing monopsony generally have taken two approaches.
One line of literature has examined whether there is a cross-sectional
relationship between wage levels and either labor market concentration
or measures of worker mobility suggested by the “new monopsony”
literature (Manning 2003). Several studies have found that RN wages are
lower when there are fewer hospitals or when hospital markets are more
concentrated (Hurd 1973; Link and Landon 1975; Bruggink et al. 1985;
Robinson 1988). However, studies that more carefully adjust for other
regional factors, such as the cost of living, find no evidence that market
concentration per se is associated with lower wages (Adamache and Sloan
1982; Feldman and Scheffler 1982; Hirsch and Schumacher 1995). Hirsch
and Schumacher (2005) find some evidence among women that wages are
lower in markets with lower worker mobility, but not for RNs.
A more recent approach has sought to explicitly estimate the elasticity
or inverse elasticity of labor supply to an individual hospital. In a simple
static model of monopsony, the inverse elasticity of labor supply is a
measure of “exploitation” analogous to the Lerner index and equals the
percentage amount that the wage lies below marginal revenue product
(see Boal and Ransom 1997). Sullivan (1989) estimated a wage elasticity
of supply to individual hospitals of 1.26 over a 1-year period and 3.85
over a 3-year period, using a national sample of hospitals from 1980 to
1985. In contrast, Hansen (1992), using an almost identical methodology,
found that supply was very elastic in California from 1980 to 1987. Hansen’s estimates of the labor supply elasticity ranged from 29 to 56.2 In a
dynamic model, these short-run elasticity estimates will overstate the
amount of exploitation if labor supply is more elastic in the long run.
Under reasonable assumptions, even Sullivan’s estimates suggest that monopsony power is small in this market, with RN wages no more than
10% below marginal revenue product (Boal and Ransom 1997).
There are two reasons to believe that these estimates may overstate the
short-run supply elasticity (and thereby understate the amount of monopsony power). First, in both papers, hospital days are assumed to be
exogenous demand shifters and serve as instruments in estimating the
supply curve by two-stage least squares (2SLS). Therefore, these papers’
2SLS estimates of elasticities greater than 1 reflect the fact that for a given
decline in hospital days, we observed RN employment to fall by more
(often much more) than RN wages. However, reimbursement of hospitals
2

Matsudaira (2009) finds a highly elastic labor supply of nurse aides, using
changes in minimum staffing rules in California as an instrument for demand.
Unfortunately, the staffing rules had little impact on higher-skilled nurses and
could not be used to accurately estimate labor supply elasticities for RNs.
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changed dramatically over this period with the introduction of Medicare’s
Prospective Payment System in 1984, and hospitals responded to this
change by reducing days spent in the hospital (Coulam and Gaumer 1991).
This suggests that much of the observed variation in hospital days over
the early 1980s was endogenous. If hospital days were chosen endogenously, one would expect a positive association between the error in the
supply equation and hospital days. This would bias the 2SLS method
toward overstating the positive relationship between hospital days and
RN employment and would therefore bias upward the estimate of the
elasticity of supply.
A second reason to believe that these estimates may overstate the shortrun supply elasticity is that both studies measure the wage using the
average RN wage in the hospital. If a wage increase results in disproportionate hiring at the entry level, and entry-level workers are paid less,
then the change in the average wage will tend to understate the actual
change in the wage (because of the shift toward entry-level workers). As
a result, estimates of the labor supply elasticity will be biased upward
(Boal and Ransom 1997, n. 25).
III. RN Wages and VA Policy
In 1991, the VA went from paying RN wages based on a national scale
to a system that set RN wages based on a local wage survey. This legislated
change in RN wages at VA hospitals provides an ideal opportunity to
examine whether there is monopsonistic competition in the RN labor
market while avoiding many of the problems of the previous literature.
A short panel of data is available for VA and non-VA hospitals with
complete information on staffing levels, patient caseloads, wages (including starting wages), and other hospital characteristics. The data can be
first-differenced to control for variation in the cost of living and unmeasured attributes of hospitals. Finally, no assumptions need to be made
about exogenous demand shocks, since the legislation generates exogenous
changes in wages at VA hospitals, and these changes can in turn be used
to construct instruments for wage changes at competing non-VA hospitals.
Prior to 1991, the VA set RN wages in all of its hospitals according to
a national pay scale, with only minor adjustments to wages in hospitals
in high-wage markets. This policy seriously affected the VA’s ability to
recruit and retain RNs for two reasons. First, VA wages tended to lag
behind the market throughout the 1980s as real wages of RNs rose rapidly
(Buerhaus and Staiger 1996). More important, this policy caused VA wages
to diverge from those of local labor markets, because nurse wages vary
widely across regions. VA hospitals could respond somewhat to market
conditions by obtaining waivers for wage increases from the VA central
office. Although the waiver system improved the ability of VA hospitals
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to match market wages, the waivers were constrained by VA budgets and
were often granted after local wages had risen further. For example, based
on data from 1990 (see Sec. V below), starting RN wages in Milwaukee—
a relatively low-wage market—averaged $11.20 per hour at non-VA hospitals, while the VA starting wage was competitive at $11.65 per hour.
However, in San Francisco—a relatively high-wage market—the VA wage
lagged well behind the market, with non-VA hospitals paying an average
hourly wage of $16.30 and local VA hospitals paying only $14.00.
The VA sought to remedy this problem with the passage of the Nurse
Pay Act of 1990, which changed how the VA set wages for RNs, effective
April 7, 1991 (Department of Veterans Affairs 1991). This law tied RN
wages at each VA hospital to those that prevailed in its local labor market,
with market wages determined by an annual survey of other hospitals in
each VA hospital’s region.3 As a result, wage scales of RNs were immediately raised to match the market in the roughly two-thirds of VA
hospitals that had been paying below the prevailing market wage.4 At the
remaining VA hospitals that were paying above-market wages, wages were
held constant in nominal terms until they came in line with the prevailing
market wage. Thus the law generated an exogenous change in RN wages
at VA hospitals, with the magnitude of the wage change varying across
hospitals.
The local wage surveys determined wages in four broad pay grades
(defined by qualifications and experience), so that entry wages and wages
of more experienced RNs were affected differently. The VA reported that
wages increased more for entry-level RNs following the Nurse Pay Act,
leading to pay compression within the VA (U.S. General Accounting
Office 1992). Our data were restricted to entry-level wages and therefore
may overstate the wage change at the VA (in contrast to the usual approach
of using average wages, which tends to understate the wage change).
In addition to mandating wage changes, the Nurse Pay Act of 1990
provided each VA hospital with additional funds in its budget to finance
its increased wage bills (including any new hires to fill existing vacancies)
without reducing other expenditures. As a result, individual VA hospitals
that had their wages raised by the act were free to hire additional RNs
up to previously determined staffing needs, with the costs being passed
on to the central office. During the study period, staffing needs were well
3

The local market for each VA hospital was defined as the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which
the VA hospital was located. The 27 VA hospitals in rural areas were allowed to
determine their local competitors within reasonable limits. If there were 15 or
fewer non-VA hospitals in the local market, all hospitals were surveyed. If there
were more than 15 other hospitals, the survey was based on a sample of the other
hospitals.
4
These figures are computed from the data discussed below.
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above pre–Nurse Pay Act staffing levels for nearly all VA hospitals. Staffing needs (and the associated budget) for each VA hospital were allocated
to units based on workload (inpatient plus outpatient visits, adjusted for
the types of visits), and there was limited ability within units to substitute
lower-skilled personnel (e.g., aides) for RNs. Thus, each unit was allocated
a fixed number of nursing full-time equivalents (FTEs), and there was
little discretion. Because RN wages at the VA hospitals were below wages
at other hospitals (particularly in high-wage areas), the VA hospitals had
difficulty filling these positions, resulting in high vacancy rates prior to
the Nurse Pay Act (U.S. General Accounting Office 1992).
In summary, the Nurse Pay Act of 1990 provides a unique opportunity
to examine the extent of monopsony power in the nurse labor market.
We can estimate the elasticity of supply of RNs to individual hospitals
based on a legislated change in the wage, unrelated to changes in supply
shocks, at VA hospitals in which labor demand was not binding. Moreover, we can learn to what extent hospitals have wage-setting power by
observing whether non-VA hospitals adjusted their wages in response to
the change in VA wages.
IV. Theoretical Model
Consider a general model of monopsony in which firms face a labor
supply curve that is upward sloping in their own wage and downward
sloping in the wage of competitors:
Li p f(w1 , w2 , … , wk ), where

⭸Li
⭸Li
1 0,
! 0 for i ( j, i p 0, … , k.
⭸wi
⭸wj
(1)

A profit-maximizing firm will set wages to maximize R(Li ) ⫺ Li # wi,
where R(.) is the firm’s revenue function, Li is the firm’s employment,
and wi is the firm’s wage. The first-order condition for this problem
implies:
MRP ⫺ w
w

p ⫺1,

(2)

where MRP is the marginal revenue product of labor and e is the ownwage elasticity of labor supply. Thus, the own-wage elasticity of labor
supply is the key to measuring monopsony power and summarizes the
extent to which a firm may reduce wages below MRP.
To guide our empirical work, we consider a simplified version of equation (1). Our model is an application of Salop’s (1979) model of competition around a circle. We assume RNs are distributed uniformly around
a circle, and they choose to work at one of N hospitals. Given our focus
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on short-run labor supply, we ignore the issue of hospital entry and exit
and treat N as fixed.5 Hospitals are located equidistantly around the circle,
with the distance between hospitals (and the number of nurses located
between hospitals) equal to a. A nurse located between two hospitals will
choose to work at the hospital at which the wage, net of travel costs, is
highest. Letting t represent the travel costs per unit distance, it is straightforward to derive the labor supply facing a given hospital as a function
of its own wage and the wage of its nearest competitors:
Li p a ⫹

1
wi⫺1 ⫹ wi⫹1
wi ⫺
, i p 1, … , N,
t
2

(

)

(3)

where wi⫺1 and wi⫹1 are wages at the two adjacent hospitals. Thus, the
simple structure of competition along a circle yields a labor supply equation that depends only on the gap between a hospital’s wage and the
average wage of its two nearest competitors. Total labor supply to the
market is assumed fixed (e.g., a doubling of all wages does not affect the
labor supply to any individual hospital).
Wages at the VA are set exogenously by federal policy, but wages at
all other hospitals are assumed to be set endogenously. If the marginal
benefit to a hospital of employing a nurse is b, we assume that hospitals
set wages to maximize the total net benefits derived from RNs; that is,
they choose w to maximize L(b ⫺ w). The first-order condition for this
maximization problem provides the wage-setting equation (i.e., labor demand) for the model:
wi p b ⫺ tLi .

(4)

Thus, wages are set below MRP, and the size of the wage markdown
depends on the slope of the labor supply equation (3).
Equations (3) and (4) provide the structural equations for the model.
The labor supply equation (3) cannot be estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS), since wages are set endogenously according to equation
(4). Estimation of the labor supply equation requires valid instruments—
that is, variables that are correlated with wages but not correlated with
the error in the labor supply equation (a). If one hospital in the market
(the VA hospital) sets the wage independently of a, then that wage can
serve as an instrument since it will affect the wages at all other hospitals
in the market.
It is relatively straightforward to solve this model of competition on a
circle and derive the reduced-form equation for each hospital’s equilibrium wage. Note that this reduced-form equation is important in that it
5
The 1992 American Hospital Association survey discussed below has about
1% fewer observations than the 1990 data. Thus, the assumption that the number
of hospitals is constant does not seem overly restrictive.
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serves as the first-stage equation in estimating labor supply. In the standard
model of competition on a circle, all hospitals would be identical, and the
solution would be a symmetric wage equilibrium with w* p b ⫺ at. Our
model is not symmetric, since the VA hospital differs from all non-VA
hospitals in that its wage is set exogenously. Therefore, the equilibrium
is asymmetric with equilibrium wages at non-VA hospitals depending on
the distance between each hospital and the VA hospital. Distance (d) is
measured by the number of hospitals located between a given hospital
and the VA hospital (e.g., d p 0 for the two hospitals located adjacent
to the VA hospital).
If there is only one VA hospital setting wages exogenously in each
market, then (after some algebra) equilibrium wages at non-VA hospitals
can be shown to be a weighted average of the VA wage (wVA) and the
symmetric equilibrium wage (w*):
wi p (1 ⫺ vi )w* ⫹ viwVA.

(5)

The weight placed on the VA wage (vi ) captures the effect of the VA wage
on wages at non-VA hospitals and depends only on the number of hospitals (N) in the market and each hospital’s distance from the VA (d). It
is straightforward to derive three useful properties of vi in this model.
First, vi is between 0 and 1/2, which implies that non-VA hospitals will
respond partially to VA wage changes. Furthermore, vi decreases with
distance from the VA hospital (⭸vi /⭸d ! 0 ), as one would expect if hospitals
are differentiated by location. Finally, vi decreases with the number of
competitors on the circle (⭸vi /⭸N ! 0), suggesting that non-VA hospitals
will respond less to VA wage changes when the VA has a smaller share
of the market.
This simple model of the RN labor market is useful for two reasons.
First, the model has empirical implications. Structural labor supply to a
particular hospital depends only on the wage gap between a given hospital
and its nearest neighbors, increasing with the wage paid by that hospital
and decreasing with the wage paid by nearby hospitals. Furthermore,
wages at non-VA hospitals are positively related to VA wage changes,
with the strongest effect of VA wages at hospitals located near the VA
and with few competitors. The second reason that the model is useful is
that it demonstrates how changes in VA wages can be used to identify
the labor supply equation. Changes in VA wages provide a natural instrument for identifying the labor supply equation, since these changes
are arguably exogenous and affect wages at all hospitals either directly
(at VA hospitals) or indirectly (at non-VA hospitals through eq. [5]).
V. Data
The data used in this study are obtained from several publicly available
sources and from the VA’s records. The unit of observation for our anal-
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ysis is a hospital. Our primary sources of information about nurse wages
and employment in non-VA hospitals are the American Hospital Association (AHA) Nursing Personnel Surveys (NPS) of 1990 and 1992. Thus,
we have 1 year of data prior to the Nurse Pay Act (1990) and 1 year of
data that was entirely postimplementation (1992). Unfortunately, data are
not available from the NPS after 1992.
The 1990 NPS surveyed all hospitals in the United States, while the
1992 data are limited to nonfederal facilities. This survey collects detailed
information about RN employment and wages, along with a wide variety
of additional information such as budgeted positions, the mix of nursing
staff (RNs, licensed practical nurses, etc.), tenure, education, vacancy and
turnover rates, work schedules, collective bargaining, and temporary and
foreign nurse utilization. The NPS was used to obtain wages for non-VA
hospitals, to calculate market wages faced by all hospitals, and to provide
background information about each hospital. In 1992, less than half of
the hospitals surveyed responded to questions about wages and employment levels, limiting our sample size significantly.
The AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals provides additional data on
hospital characteristics for VA and non-VA facilities and is available in
1990 and 1992 for most hospitals in the United States. These surveys
include a wide range of information about general hospital characteristics
and provided us with information on hospital location. The AHA survey
also includes some data about nurse staffing, which were used to check
the validity of the NPS.
The VA Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID) system,
salary surveys conducted for the locality pay system, and published VA
data on employment levels of nurses provide most of our information on
VA hospitals, since federal hospitals did not respond to the NPS in 1992.
The VA’s Centralized Accounting for Local Management (CALM) system
830 file contains facility-level information on the aggregate number of
RNs on staff (FTE) and their average salary. The VA PAID system data
file is used to measure starting wages for RNs at VA hospitals. The personnel office at the VA’s central office provided copies of the Nurse Pay
Act RN pay schedules for each VA medical center and copies of the wage
surveys. These provide additional data on the changes in RN wages at
VA hospitals and wages at hospitals that compete with the VA hospitals.
We also used these data to check the accuracy of the NPS data in 1990.
Cross-checks of the different data reveal little inconsistency in our
measures of wages, employment levels, and hospital characteristics. This
alleviates any concern arising from the fact that the NPS and AHA data
are based on hospital responses to surveys. Similarly, the VA accounting
data should be of high quality, since they are from an internal accounting
system instead of survey responses. While it is likely that some mea-
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surement error exists in our data, we do not believe that it is sufficiently
large to bias the results of this study.
The employment of RNs is measured as the FTE employment of RNs
in each hospital for which we have data. Wages are the lowest hourly
wage reported by the hospital. We selected the lowest hourly wage for
our wage measure for two reasons. First, the lowest wage will apply to
entry-level nurses with basic education and no experience. Thus, changes
in this wage measure will not be biased by differences across hospitals or
over time in average RN characteristics such as tenure or experience.
Second, one might argue that labor supply is particularly sensitive to
entry-level wages, because hospitals often offer nonpecuniary benefits to
retain more senior RNs, such as more choice of shifts.
Based on the latitude and longitude centroid for the zip code of each
hospital, we calculated the distance from each hospital to the nearest VA
hospital. Our final sample is limited to hospitals that are within 60 miles
of a VA hospital, and our empirical work distinguishes hospitals that are
more than 15 miles and more than 30 miles from a VA hospital.6 Similarly,
for each hospital we calculated the number of other short-term general
hospitals (from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals) within a 15-mile
radius. Finally, we used similar distance calculations to identify the two
nearest competitors for each hospital. The wage at each hospital’s two
nearest competitors is defined as the average log wage of the two hospitals
nearest to the hospital in question that report wages in both 1990 and
1992.
To some extent, each VA may have had some influence over the wage
change it experienced between 1990 and 1992 through discretion over
which hospitals to include in the wage survey. This would raise doubt
about the exogeneity of the VA wage changes. An alternative measure of
the change imposed on VA hospitals by the Nurse Pay Act is the gap
between market wages and VA wages in 1990, prior to the Nurse Pay
Act’s implementation. This 1990 wage gap is not influenced by the VA’s
actions following the act, yet it will measure the impact that the Nurse
Pay Act should have had on a VA hospital’s wages.
For each VA hospital, we calculated the gap between the VA wage and
its market’s wage in 1990 as the difference between the average log wage
in each VA hospital’s market area (weighted by hospital beds) and the
VA log wage. The VA market area is defined as either the Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) or the Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA; if a CMSA does not exist); for rural hospitals, the market area
includes all other rural hospitals in the state. As can be seen in figure 1,
the difference between the market wage and the VA wage in 1990 was a
strong predictor of the change in the VA wage from 1990 to 1992. Finally,
6

Our results are not sensitive to the 60-mile limit in our sample.
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Fig. 1.—Difference between the market wage and the VA wage in 1990 and its association
with the change in the VA wage from 1990 to 1992. Each point represents data for a single
VA hospital in our sample, with the simple regression line for these data also displayed.

to control for differences in the cost of living and local labor market
conditions, we construct dummy variables for the CMSA/MSA in which
each hospital is located and, for rural hospitals, dummy variables for the
remainder of the state.
Table 1 presents selected summary statistics for all hospitals, for VA
hospitals, and for non-VA hospitals. In 1990, just under 60% of VA
hospitals paid wages that were below market, with the average VA hospital
paying 1.9% below market. There was considerable variation in the wage
gap across VA hospitals. The Nurse Pay Act brought VA wages up to
the market level in 1992. As a result, VA wages increased more between
1990 and 1992 (12.5%) than did wages at non-VA hospitals (9.9%), and
the variation in wage growth was larger at VA hospitals as well. Growth
in employment also was more rapid at VA hospitals, with RN FTEs
increasing by 8.3% as compared to 5.6% in non-VA hospitals. Thus, VA
wages increased by 2.6% more than non-VA wages following the Nurse
Pay Act, and VA employment increased by 2.7% more than non-VA
employment. These estimates suggest a labor supply elasticity of around
1, although the standard error on this simple Wald estimate is over 0.7.
The remaining variables in table 1 describe the ownership and location
of the hospitals in our sample. Just over 10% of the sample is VA hospitals.
Non-VA hospitals are, on average, 23 miles from the nearest VA, with
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for RN Wages and Employment, 1990–92

Wage gap at nearest VA in 1990 (log (market
wage) ⫺ log (VA wage))
Nearest VA wage below market in 1990?
Change in log wage (1990–92)
Change in log wage (1990–92) at nearest VA
Change in average log wage (1990–92) at two
nearest competitors
Change in RN full-time equivalents (1990–92)
VA hospital?
Distance to nearest VA (miles)
More than 15 miles to nearest VA?
More than 30 miles to nearest VA?
No. of hospitals within 15 miles
No. of observations in sample

All

VA

Non-VA

.013
(.081)
53.0%
.102
(.073)
.122
(.093)

.019
(.079)
58.7%
.125
(.088)
.125
(.088)

.012
(.081)
50.0%
.099
(.070)
.122
(.094)

.102
(.056)
.059
(.212)
11.6%
20.3
(18.2)
50.4%
30.4%
11.6
(17.3)
1,334

.101
(.058)
.083
(.088)
100%
0
(0)
0%
0%
10.9
(15.6)
155

.102
(.056)
.056
(.223)
0%
23.0
(17.7)
57.0%
34.4%
11.7
(17.5)
1,179

Note.—Values are means, and standard deviations are in parentheses.

over half of the sample more than 15 miles from the nearest VA and about
one-third more than 30 miles. On average, both VA and non-VA hospitals
have more than 10 competitors within a 15-mile radius, although there
is significant variation in the number of competitors.
VI. Empirical Analysis
A. Reduced-Form Wage Equations for Non-VA Hospitals
We examine the effect of the VA’s wage changes on wages at other
hospitals by estimating the reduced-form wage equation (5) in differenced
form:
D(ln wi ) p a 0 ⫹ a1 D(ln wiVA) ⫹ a 2 D15 i D(ln wiVA)
⫹ a 3 D30 i D(ln wiVA) ⫹ i ,

(6)

where wi is the wage at a non-VA hospital, wiVA is the wage at the nearest
VA hospital to hospital i, and D15 i and D30 i are dummy variables that
equal 1 if hospital i is more than 15 miles or more than 30 miles, respectively, from a VA hospital. We take the difference of each variable
between 1990 and 1992 to control for hospital characteristics that are
constant over time. As discussed above, we expect a1 1 0 and a 2 , a 3 ! 0;
that is, the change in the VA wage should have a positive effect on the
wage change in other hospitals, but this effect should decline in magnitude
as hospitals are farther from the VA hospital.
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Table 2
Reduced-Form Estimates of the Impact of VA Wage Changes on the
Wage Changes in Non-VA Hospitals, 1990–92
Independent Variable
Change in log wage of RNs at the nearest VA
(1990–92)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.128
(.033)

.178
(.043)

.137
(.077)

.190
(.106)

Change in log wage of RNs at the nearest VA
(1990–92) # dummy if 1 15 miles to VA

⫺.078 ⫺.105 ⫺.139
(.040) (.042) (.082)

Change in log wage of RNs at the nearest VA
(1990–92) # dummy if 1 30 miles to VA
Dummy if 1 15 miles to VA
Dummy if 1 30 miles to VA
MSA dummies?
R2
No. of observations

No
.029
1,179

⫺.049 ⫺.035 ⫺.100
(.037) (.056) (.098)
.008
(.012)
.013
(.014)
No
Yes
Yes
.044
.274
.276
1,179 1,179 1,179

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
level. Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. Based on data from
the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals and the Nursing Personnel Survey,
1990 and 1992, augmented with wage and employment information for VA hospitals from VA
administrative data. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. Dependent variable p
ln (wage92) ⫺ ln (wage90).

Estimates of equation (6) are presented in table 2. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the change in the log wage of RNs at nonVA hospitals. Several variations of this equation were estimated. The first
column includes only the change in the log wage at the nearest VA hospital. The second column presents interactions between the VA wage
change and two dummy variables: one for whether the hospital is more
than 15 miles from a VA hospital and another for whether there is more
than a 30-mile distance. The third column adds MSA dummy variables
to allow for area-specific trends in wages. Finally, the fourth column adds
dummy variables for being more than 15 and 30 miles from a VA hospital.
Standard errors for these and all subsequent regression estimates account
for clustering at the MSA level.
The results for all specifications are consistent with the theory. The VA
wage change has a positive and significant effect on wages at neighboring
hospitals, but this effect is significantly smaller (about half the magnitude)
in hospitals that are 15–30 miles from a VA hospital and disappears almost
entirely for hospitals more than 30 miles from a VA hospital. For example,
in the first column we estimate that the elasticity of wages at non-VA
hospitals with respect to the VA wage is 0.128—that is, a 1.28% increase
in response to a 10% increase in the wage at the nearest VA hospital. In
the second column we allow the effect of the VA wage to vary with the
distance to the VA hospital. The estimated elasticity increases to 0.178

Monopsony in the Labor Market

225

Table 3
Reduced-Form Estimates of the Impact of the VA Wage Gap in 1990 on
the Wage Changes in VA and Non-VA Hospitals, 1990–92

Independent Variables
Wage gap at nearest VA in
1990 (log (market wage) ⫺
log (VA wage))

VA
Only
(1)

Non-VA
Only
(2)

Non-VA
Only
(3)

Non-VA
Only
(4)

Non-VA
Only
(5)

.830
(.055)

.090
(.034)

.161
(.061)

.345
(.067)

.344
(.065)

⫺.109
(.075)

⫺.154
(.072)

⫺.146
(.071)

⫺.033
(.064)

⫺.112
(.091)

No
.017
1,179

Yes
.281
1,179

⫺.120
(.091)
⫺.008
(.006)
.000
(.008)
Yes
.282
1,179

Wage gap at nearest VA in
1990 # dummy if 1 15
miles to VA
Wage gap at nearest VA in
1990 # dummy if 1 30
miles to VA
Dummy if 1 15 miles to VA
Dummy if 1 30 miles to VA
MSA dummies?
R2
No. of observations

No
.559
155

No
.011
1,179

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
level. Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. Based on data from the
American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals and the Nursing Personnel Survey, 1990
and 1992, augmented with wage and employment information for VA hospitals from VA administrative
data. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. The market wage is calculated as the average
starting wage in 1990 among hospitals in each VA hospital’s market. The market wage is a weighted
average, using the number of hospital beds as weights. Markets are Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (CMSAs), MSAs for hospitals not in a CMSA, and states for hospitals not in an MSA or CMSA.
Dependent variable p ln (wage92) ⫺ ln (wage90).

for hospitals within 15 miles of a VA hospital (the reference group) but
is significantly lower for hospitals 15–30 miles from the VA (0.100) and
lower still for hospitals more than 30 miles from the VA (0.051).7 Results
for the remaining specifications are quite similar.
Changes in the VA wage were not entirely determined by the law since
VA hospitals had some discretion in determining which hospitals to survey
in setting 1992 wages. Thus, some of the positive correlation between VA
wage growth and wage growth at nearby hospitals may reflect the VA’s
response to wages at other hospitals. The gap between the market wage
and the VA wage in 1990 is used in table 3 as a proxy that predicts the
wage growth that resulted from the Nurse Pay Act. This wage gap in
1990 is not influenced by the VA’s later actions. The first column of table
3 estimates the relationship between this proxy and actual wage growth
between 1990 and 1992 at the VA hospitals. There is a very strong re7
Note that eq. (6) is specified so that the effects are cumulative; e.g., the effect
of the VA wage on wages at hospitals more than 30 miles away is 0.178 ⫺
0.078 ⫺ 0.049 p 0.051.
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Table 4
Reduced-Form Estimates of the Impact of VA Wage Changes on the Wage
Changes in Non-VA Hospitals, 1990–92, for Alternative Samples of
Hospitals
! 5 Competitors

Independent
Variables
Wage gap at nearest
VA in 1990
Wage gap at nearest
VA in 1990 #
dummy if 1 15
miles to VA
Wage gap at nearest
VA in 1990 #
dummy if 1 30
miles to VA
MSA dummies?
R2
No. of observations

within
15 Miles
(1)

≥ 5 Competitors Positive Wage Negative Wage
within
Gap at
Gap at
15 Miles
Nearest VA
Nearest VA
(3)
(4)
(2)

.348
(.202)

.403
(.035)

.558
(.205)

.127
(.245)

⫺.168
(.208)

⫺.199
(.125)

⫺.179
(.098)

.030
(.124)

⫺.155
(.107)
Yes
.366
612

.162
(.204)
Yes
.260
567

⫺.184
(.140)
Yes
.343
616

⫺.021
(.178)
Yes
.240
563

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. Based on data from the American
Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals and the Nursing Personnel Survey, 1990 and 1992,
augmented with wage and employment information for VA hospitals from VA administrative data. All
wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. Dependent variable p ln (wage92) ⫺ ln (wage90).

lationship between the wage gap that existed for each VA in 1990 and
each VA’s subsequent wage growth, with a precisely estimated coefficient
on the wage gap that is near 1 and an R 2 on this simple regression of just
over 0.5.
The remaining columns of table 3 (cols. 2–5) estimate the same specifications as in table 2 for non-VA hospitals, using the wage gap from
1990 in place of actual wage growth at the nearest VA. The results are
quite similar to those of table 2 (although the estimated elasticities are
noticeably larger when MSA dummies are included). In particular, the
wage gap has a positive, statistically significant effect on wage growth at
non-VAs, and this effect is smaller at hospitals that are further from the
VA.
The first two columns of table 4 investigate whether the effect of the
VA wage change on other hospitals’ wage growth is larger in markets
with fewer competitors, as suggested by our simple model. The first column limits the sample to hospitals that had fewer than five competitors
within 15 miles, and the second column limits the sample to hospitals
with five or more competitors within 15 miles. Each regression includes
the VA wage gap in 1990, this gap interacted with dummy variables for
being more than 15 miles and more than 30 miles from a VA hospital,
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and MSA dummy variables. The point estimates indicate that changes in
the VA wage has similar effects on hospitals in competitive markets to
those in less competitive markets. These results provide no evidence that
a wage change at an individual hospital is less important when there are
more hospitals in the market. However, the standard errors on these
estimates are quite large, so the power of this test is obviously low.
When the VA implemented the Nurse Pay Act, it did not change nominal wages at hospitals that paid higher wages than the market. Thus, we
should not observe a response by non-VA hospitals to the 1990 VA wage
gap if the gap is negative because the negative gap was not correlated with
the actual wage change at the VA. Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 examine
this possibility. Column 3 presents the coefficients of an equation for
non-VA hospitals with a positive wage gap at the nearest VA hospital
(i.e., the VA wage is lower than the market wage). As expected, the VA
wage change has a large, statistically significant effect on non-VA hospitals’ wages. Column 4 presents the same equation for hospitals for which
the VA wage gap is negative. Where the VA medical center paid more
than the market and thus did not change its wages with the Nurse Pay
Act, the VA wage gap has no effect on the wages of other hospitals.
B. Labor Supply Equations for All Hospitals
We estimate the labor supply equation (3) in a first-difference form to
measure the elasticity of supply of RNs:

D(ln Li ) p v0 ⫹ v1 D(ln wi ⫺ ln wj ) ⫹ m i ,

(7)

where Li is the number of RN FTEs employed at hospital i (for VA
hospitals and other hospitals), wi is the wage at hospital i, ln wj is the
average log wage at hospital i’s two nearest competitors, and v1 is the
elasticity of supply of RNs to an individual hospital. We found evidence
of heteroskedasticity in the error and therefore weight all regressions by
the number of beds at the hospital in 1990.
As discussed earlier, OLS estimates of equation (7) are biased. We estimate equation (7) using two-stage least squares. The VA wage change
mandated by the Nurse Pay Act provides the instrument for the change
in the log wage gap D(ln wi ⫺ ln wj ). We take care in specifying the firststage equation. According to theory, the impact of the VA wage change
on D(ln wi ⫺ ln wj ) depends on whether the hospital and its nearest neighbors are VA hospitals and, if not, which VA hospital the hospital is closest
to and how far it is from that VA hospital. The estimates in tables 2–4
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Table 5
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of RN Labor Supply Elasticities
Independent Variables
Change in the log wage gap
between hospital and its two
nearest competitors

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.076
(.137)

.080
(.133)

.185
(.138)

.185
(.135)

No
No
No

No
Yes
No

.016
(.177)
.023
(.014)
Yes
Yes
No

No
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

.127
(.185)
.019
(.014)
Yes
Yes
Yes

.71
1,334

.45
1,334

.31
1,334

.20
1,334

.20
1,334

.12
1,334

Dummy if VA hospital
MSA dummies?
“FAR” instruments included?
“GAP” instruments used?
p-value for test of the overidentifying restrictions
No. of observations

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
level. Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. All regressions are
weighted by the number of hospital beds in 1990. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs.
Change in the log wage gap between a hospital and its two nearest competitors is defined as
[ln (wage92) ⫺ ln (wage90)] ⫺ [ln (compwage92) ⫺ ln (compwage90)], where compwage90 and compwage 92 are as defined in table A1. Specifications with “FAR” instruments use first-stage regressions given in cols. 2, 3, 5, and 6 of table A1. Specifications using “GAP” instruments use first-stage
regressions given in cols. 4–6 of table A1. Dependent variable p ln (RN FTEs, 1992) ⫺ ln (RN
FTEs, 1990).

suggest that the wage growth in any given hospital should be specified
as:
D ln wi p p0 ⫹ DVA i (p1 ⫹ p2 D ln wiVA) ⫹ (1 ⫺ DVA i )
# (p3 D ln wiVA ⫹ p4 D15 ⫹ p5 D30 ⫹ p6 D15D ln wiVA ⫹ p7 D30p ln wiVA),
(8)
where DVA is an indicator for being a VA hospital. In the first-stage
equation, we wish to estimate the difference in wage growth between a
hospital and its two nearest neighbors. Therefore, the appropriate specification for the first stage includes the differences between the hospital
and each of its two nearest neighbors. Table A1 in the appendix provides
estimates of the first-stage equations for various specifications. The coefficients are generally as expected, and F-tests indicate that the instruments are strongly correlated with the change in the wage gap.
Estimates of labor supply elasticities from two-stage least squares estimates of equation (7) are given in table 5. The first three columns construct the instruments using the actual wage change at the VA. The first
specification does not include the instruments that rely on distance from
a VA hospital, while the second specification adds these instruments.
Column 3 adds MSA dummies and a dummy for being a VA hospital to
the supply equation. The MSA dummies capture local factors (such as
alternative wages) that may influence supply, while the VA dummy captures any common change at the VA hospital that may have made em-
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Table 6
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of RN Labor Supply Elasticities
Allowing Separate Effects of Own Wage and Competitor’s Wage
Independent Variables
Change in own log wage
Change in log wage at two
nearest competitors

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.083
(.128)

.120
(.124)

.046
(.182)

.199
(.128)

.232
(.127)

.183
(.213)

⫺.006 ⫺.048
(.261) (.244)
No
No
No

No
Yes
No

.074
(.453)
.023
(.015)
Yes
Yes
No

.80
1,334

.12
1,334

.25
1,334

Dummy if VA hospital
MSA dummies?
“FAR” instruments included?
“GAP” instruments used?
p-value for test of the overidentifying restrictions
No. of observations

⫺.116 ⫺.061 ⫺.028
(.292) (.281) (.393)
.017
(.014)
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
.20
1,334

.26
1,334

.09
1,334

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
level. Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. All regressions are
weighted by the number of hospital beds in 1990. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs.
Change in log wage at two nearest competitors is [ln (compwage92) ⫺ ln (compwage90)], where compwage90 and compwage92 are as defined in table A1. Specifications with “FAR” instruments use the
same instruments as in cols. 2, 3, 5, and 6 of table A1, plus the analogous set of variables for the
hospital (e.g., not differenced from the competitor). Specifications using “GAP” instruments use the
same instruments as in cols. 4–6 of table A1, plus the analogous set of variables for the hospital (e.g.,
not differenced from the competitor). Dependent variable p ln (RN FTEs, 1992) ⫺ ln (RN FTEs,
1990).

ployment more or less attractive at the VA hospital. The remaining three
columns of table 5 repeat these specifications but construct the instruments using the wage gap at the VA hospital in 1990 as a proxy for the
actual VA wage change (for reasons discussed earlier). For all specifications, we tested and could not reject the overidentifying restrictions; therefore, our instruments appear appropriate for our model.
The labor supply elasticities estimated in table 5 are reasonably consistent across specifications. The estimates range from 0 to 0.2, with standard errors of about 0.13 to 0.18. Thus, for the specifications in table 5,
we estimate an inelastic short-run labor supply curve facing hospitals.
Even the high end of the 95% confidence intervals for the labor supply
elasticity does not go above 0.5. These estimates of labor supply elasticity
are an order of magnitude smaller than those estimated by Sullivan (1989)
and Hansen (1992).
Table 6 estimates specifications similar to those in table 5 but allows
the change in the VA’s own wage and the change in the nearest competitor’s wage to have separate effects rather than constraining them to
enter as a difference.8 If the specifications of table 5 are correct, own wage
8

For the specifications in table 6, we include own-wage growth and wage
growth at the two nearest competitors separately and instrument for both. In
those specifications, we add the undifferenced versions of the right-hand-side
variables in eq. (6) to our instrument list. These added instruments can predict
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Table 7
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of RN Labor Supply Elasticities for
Alternative Samples of Hospitals
VA
Only
(1)

Non-VA
Only
(2)

within
15 Miles
(3)

≥ 5 Hospitals
within
15 Miles
(4)

Positive Wage
Gap at
Nearest VA
(5)

.111
(.114)

⫺.073
(.267)

.590
(.334)

⫺.019
(.190)

.129
(.270)

No

Yes

⫺.024
(.024)
Yes

.037
(.016)
Yes

.020
(.021)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

.58
155

.35
1,179

.02
685

.75
649

.34
707

! 5 Hospitals

Independent
Variables
Change in the log
wage gap between
hospital and its
two nearest
competitors
Dummy if VA
hospital
MSA dummies?
“FAR” instruments
included?
“GAP” instruments
used?
p-value for test of
the overidentifying restrictions
No. of observations

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. All regressions are weighted
by the number of hospital beds in 1990. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. Change in
the log wage gap between a hospital and its two nearest competitors is defined as [ln (wage92) ⫺
ln (wage90)] ⫺ [ln (compwage92) ⫺ ln (compwage90)], where compwage90 and compwage92 are as defined
in table A1. Specifications with “FAR” instruments use first-stage regressions given in cols. 2, 3, 5, and
6 of table A1. Specifications using “GAP” instruments use first-stage regressions given in cols. 4–6 of
table A1. Dependent variable p ln (RN FTEs, 1992) ⫺ ln (RN FTEs, 1990).

and competitor’s wage should enter with opposite-signed coefficients of
the same magnitude. The coefficients are generally opposite signed, and
the magnitudes are small, with elasticity estimates for these specifications
remaining in the 0–0.2 range. The only exception is for the specification
that includes MSA dummies and the actual change in the VA wage: for
this specification, the effect of the change in log wage at the two nearest
competitors is wrong signed and poorly identified.
Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of these estimates when the sample
is restricted to (1) VA hospitals, (2) non-VA hospitals, (3) hospitals with
fewer than five competitors within 15 miles, (4) hospitals with five or
more competitors within 15 miles, and (5) hospitals for which the nearest
VA had a positive wage gap. The basic conclusions are not particularly
sensitive to these sample restrictions. All of the elasticity estimates remain
small relative to the previous literature. There is more range in the elasticity estimates for these specifications (from ⫺0.1 to 0.6), but this might
wage growth at a hospital, whereas the differenced versions can only predict the
difference in wage growth between a hospital and its neighbors.
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be expected given the relatively large standard errors for these specifications relative to those reported in table 5.
VII. Discussion
Our analysis provides two pieces of evidence that suggest that hospitals
have market power in the nurse labor market and have monopsony power
in setting wages. First, we find that competing hospitals responded to
legislated wage changes at the VA: a 10% increase in wages at the VA is
estimated to have increased wages by 2% at hospitals within 15 miles and
by roughly 1% at hospitals 15–30 miles from the VA hospital. Second,
we find that the labor supply curve facing an individual hospital is very
inelastic: a 10% increase in wages is estimated to increase labor supply
by between 0% and 2%.
These results contradict much of the recent literature investigating monopsony, which has found little (if any) evidence of monopsony power
in the labor market for nurses. In particular, our estimates of the labor
supply elasticity are an order of magnitude below comparable estimates
in the literature. This raises the question: why is this so?
One key difference between this study and others is in the instruments
used to identify the supply elasticity. We rely on a legislated change in
the wage at the VA as an instrument. Thus, our identification is similar
to recent studies of the minimum wage, which also find that legislated
changes in wages have small positive effects on employment (Card and
Krueger 1995). Moreover, these legislated changes in wages are arguably
ideal instruments for this problem because they come close to simulating
the thought experiment that matters for labor supply: how will an exogenous increase in wages affect the VA’s ability to attract nurses? The
earlier literature used changes in caseload at the hospital as an instrument.
As argued earlier, there are reasons to believe that caseload may not be
a valid instrument and that the potential bias would be in the direction
of overstating supply elasticities. However, it is possible that the VA
adjusted nonwage margins (e.g., schedule flexibility) in ways that offset
the legislated wage increase. If so, our elasticity estimates would be biased
downward because the observed change in wages overstates the net change
in wage plus nonwage compensation.
A second difference is our data. We have relied on starting wage data
(rather than average wages), which avoids potential aggregation bias that
may lead to downward bias in estimating wage changes (and hence an
upward bias in estimating the supply elasticity). However, because the
Nurse Pay Act may have increased starting wages more than other wages,
our approach may have an upward bias in estimating wage changes (and
hence a downward bias in estimating the supply elasticity). Another difference in our data is that we focus on the difference between a hospital’s
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wages and those of its nearest competitors, while the existing literature
has generally measured competing wages as average wages at the county
or MSA level. Finally, our estimates rely on data from 1990–92, while
both Sullivan (1989) and Hansen (1992) use data from the early and mid1980s, when dramatic changes in hospital reimbursement may have resulted in bias. While reimbursement rules were stable in our sample period,
RN wages were growing rapidly prior to the Nurse Pay Act (Buerhaus
and Staiger 1996), and it is possible that labor supply was less responsive
to the current wage because of rapidly changing wages at all hospitals.
Apart from differences in our data and instruments, our focus on VA
hospitals may be generating the difference in our findings. Our evidence
of market power may be due to the fact that VA hospitals are highly
differentiated workplaces (by being a federal employer and serving a
unique cohort of patients). The supply of nurses might thus be segmented
according to RNs’ preferences for working or not working at VA facilities,
reducing the response of labor supply to the change in the VA wage.
Bhaskar and To (1999) and Manning (2003) suggest that this type of
differentiation might produce monopsony power in other employment
sectors. For example, within the fast-food or high-tech industries, workplaces are also highly differentiated in terms of corporate culture and
customer base. Therefore, our results may be representative of the monopsony power exercised by many employers.
Our estimates of the short-run labor supply elasticity around 0.1 are
quite low. If these were long-run elasticity estimates, they would imply
that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of RNs was about 10 times
their wage. However, common sense and most empirical studies (Sullivan
1989; Hansen 1992) suggest that long-run elasticities are considerably
higher than short-run elasticities. Unfortunately, data were unavailable to
examine longer-run supply elasticities.9 However, if we assume that the
long-run elasticity is infinite, then Boal and Ransom (1997) have shown
that the amount of “exploitation”—the difference between MRP and the
wage as a fraction of the wage—is given by the short-run inverse elasticity
of supply multiplied by r/(1 ⫹ r), where r is the discount rate. Thus, for
a discount rate of 5%, our elasticity estimates imply that the MRP of
RNs was about 50% above their wages. This evidence, therefore, suggests
that hospitals have considerable monopsony power.

9

The last year of the NPS was 1992.

Appendix

Table A1
First-Stage Estimates Predicting the Change in the Wage Gap between a
Hospital and Its Two Nearest Competitors, 1990–92
Using the Actual Change
in the Log Wage
at the Nearest VA
Independent Variables
Difference between
hospital and nearest
competitor in:
(1) Dummy for VA
hospital (DVA)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

⫺.020
(.007)

⫺.018
(.007)

⫺.017
(.010)

.014
(.005)

.016
(.005)

.022
(.008)

.019
(.015)

.018
(.019)

.006
(.007)

.011
(.008)

.016
(.012)

.022
(.015)

.015
(.006)

.022
(.007)

.477
(.140)

.548
(.163)

.606
(.215)

.659
(.139)

.754
(.158)

.821
(.219)

.149
(.137)

.227
(.166)

.268
(.212)

.331
(.129)

.438
(.156)

.485
(.210)

⫺.134
(.091)

⫺.110
(.117)

⫺.123
(.096)

⫺.111
(.130)

⫺.060
(.093)

⫺.028
(.118)

⫺.048
(.080)

⫺.061
(.097)

⫺.051
(.011)

⫺.049
(.017)

.000
(.006)

.004
(.011)

⫺.003
(.009)

⫺.008
(.010)

⫺.005
(.005)

⫺.016
(.006)

⫺.004
(.013)

⫺.012
(.016)

⫺.004
(.007)

⫺.009
(.008)

.570
(.080)

.595
(.121)

.419
(.104)

.536
(.152)

(2) Dummy if 1 15 miles
from VA (D15)
(3) Dummy if 1 30 miles
from VA (D30)
(4) DVA # change in
log wage of RNs at
nearest VA
(5) (1 ⫺ DVA) #
change in log wage of
RNs at nearest VA
(6) D15 # change in log
wage of RNs at
nearest VA
(7) D30 # change in log
wage of RNs at
nearest VA
Difference between hospital and second nearest
competitor in:
(1) Dummy for VA
hospital (DVA)

⫺.050
(.010)

(2) Dummy if 1 15 miles
from VA (D15)
(3) Dummy if 1 30 miles
from VA (D30)
(4) DVA # change in
log wage of RNs at
nearest VA

Using the VA Log Wage
Gap in 1990 as
Proxy for Wage Change
at the VA

.569
(.082)

.001
(.006)

.433
(.100)
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Table A1 (Continued)
Using the Actual Change
in the Log Wage
at the Nearest VA
Independent Variables
(5) (1 ⫺ DVA) #
change in log wage of
RNs at nearest VA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.108
(.064)

.112
(.073)

.126
(.102)

.007
(.075)

⫺.019
(.100)

.107
(.137)

.011
(.055)

⫺.020
(.058)

.044
(.073)

⫺.019
(.084)

⫺.007
(.073)

.019
(.107)

⫺.011
(.081)

.006
(.104)

No
.254

No
.258

⫺.010
(.015)
Yes
.360

No
.203

No
.208

⫺.016
(.015)
Yes
.322

61.70
(.000)
1,334

33.62
(.000)
1,334

28.69
(.000)
1,334

43.36
(.000)
1,334

20.29
(.000)
1,334

19.32
(.000)
1,334

(6) D15 # change in log
wage of RNs at
nearest VA
(7) D30 # change in log
wage of RNs at
nearest VA
Indicator if hospital is a
VA
MSA dummies?
R2
F-test of instruments
( p-value)
No. of observations

Using the VA Log Wage
Gap in 1990 as
Proxy for Wage Change
at the VA

Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
Sample includes all non-VA hospitals within 60 miles of a VA hospital. All regressions are weighted by
the number of hospital beds in 1990. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. Wages of
competitors (compwage92 and compwage90) are the average log wage of the hospital’s two closest
competitors that report wages in both 1990 and 1992. Cols. 4–6 use the VA log wage gap in 1990
(log (market wage) ⫺ log (VA wage)) in place of the change in the log VA wage in constructing all
independent variables. The market wage is constructed as discussed in the note to table 3. Dependent
variable p [ln (wage92) ⫺ ln (wage90)] ⫺ [ln (compwage92) ⫺ ln (compwage90)].
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